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INTRODUCTION
The pivotal question for the current immigration debate is the extent of the
impact that immigrants exercise on the labor market. Most experts argue that
"push," not "pull," has been chiefly responsible for impelling the migration of
relatively unskilled and uneducated migrants from poorer, developing countries.
These new immigrants, they contend, have succeeded in obtaining "good" jobs
that are normally desired by national workers. The presence of immigrants, how-
ever, has increased the supply of labor in the United States, thereby depressing
wages, creating unemployment, and distorting normal labor market patterns. The
alternative argument, articulated by a minority of analysts, is that the new immi-
gration is but the latest in a series of external and internal migration flows that
have fed into the lower levels of the labor market. In contrast to the displacement
theses, these scholars maintain that immigrants comprise a "noncompeting" group
occupying bottom level work stations that complement the higher level jobs filled
by natives.
If the focus is expanded beyond the issue of the impact of immigration on
American society, one notices critical implications for the future of immigration
hidden in the crossfire of debate. Despite the focus on present conditions, each of
the two competing viewpoints also suggests a distinctive scenario for the long term
absorption of the new immigrants into American society. If the immigrants are
obtaining "good" jobs, then it is likely that they and their descendants will secure
a slow but steady climb from their present places in the occupational structure.
On the other hand, if the immigrants have acquired "bad" jobs that national
workers disdain, then they may have simply passed through a tarnished door-an
economic cul-de-sac offering no passage into the core economy.
The uncertainty that attends this issue reveals a sense that American society
has changed too radically for the historical experience of immigrants to serve as a
valid guide. To be sure, that experience is a story of initial disadvantage turned to
good fortune in the face of considerable prejudice and antagonism. The descend-
ants of Polish steelworkers, Russian-Jewish garment makers, and Italian long-
shoremen have moved upwards impressively in two to four generations. Today
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their educational and occupational accomplishments rival, when they do not out-
rank, the achievements of their "old immigrant" Protestant counterparts.' Nor is
the progress of more recent immigrants out of line with the historical trend;
indexed by income, legal immigrants in the 1950's and early 1960's did well, out-
performing their native counterparts on that important measure.
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Yet it is also apparent that the opportunities of which the earlier immigrants
availed themselves no longer exist in similar number or form. The America that
the turn-of-the-century immigrants encountered was an economy based on goods
production in which seven out of every ten Americans found employment in man-
ufacturing, agriculture, or mining. 3 That economy grew in robust fashion, in stark
contrast to the current sluggish state of affairs. Expansion generated a demand for
willing hands and strong muscles, nimble fingers and bent backs-not diplomas or
technical expertise. Immigrant-dominated industries like textiles, mining, or steel
asked for nothing more than a displaced peasant or artisan willing to subject him-
self to the ardors and dangers of industrial work. Neither literacy, language, nor
technical ability were adjudged imperative for employment; mechanical skill
could be acquired in "hands-on" fashion on the job.4
A brief sketch suggests how different the situation is today. Goods production
furnishes employment for only three out of every ten workers, and the number of
manufacturing jobs has remained virtually stagnant for much of the decade.5
Industries such as steel and automobiles that once beckoned to newcomers have
shriveled, now providing unstable and diminishing prospects of employment.
Other sectors that once absorbed immigrants in large numbers now offer only
unsteady jobs and monetary returns that incessantly slide further below the
average wage.
More importantly, perhaps, the industrial labor market lacks the fluidity it
possessed at the turn of the century. "Dual labor market" theorists argue that the
economy is currently segmented into two sectors. The "primary sector" consists of
large, generally unionized firms paying high wages, guaranteeing considerable job
security, and providing opportunities for advancement. The "secondary labor
market," composed of small firms engaged in highly competitive industries, offers
near-poverty wage levels, minimal shelters from instability, and scant opportuni-
ties for mobility. Job openings in the primary sector are limited and carefully
rationed; even during periods of expansion, heavy investments in capital tend to
reduce the need for labor. By contrast, entry into the secondary sector is consider-
ably easier, especially for such marginal worker groups as domestic racial minori-
ties, women, and foreign workers. Subsequent progress, however, is problematic.
Shrunken job ladders limit intrafirm mobility. Secondary firms, vulnerable to
changes in the economic conditions, typically adjust employment levels to rela-
1. A. GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC: A SOCIAL PORTRAIT 50-68 (1979).
2. Chiswick, The Economtc Progress of Immigrants.- Some Apparently Universal Patterns, in 1979 AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 357, 372-76.
3. D. BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 129 (1973).
4. P. TAYLOR, THE DISTANT MAGNET: EUROPEAN EMIGRATION TO THE U.S.A. 192-201 (1971).
5. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, Jan. 1981,
at 210.
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tively slight shifts in demand. For workers who cannot escape into the primary
market, then, the secondary sector is a morass providing an ample supply of
equally undesirable, dead end jobs.6
While changes at the lower levels of the labor market suggest diminished
opportunities there, other shifts portend further difficulties. Growth has occurred
in those fields in which immigrants with traditional backgrounds are least likely to
qualify: white-collar, technical, and professional occupations in which specialized
skills are often demanded. Educational requirements have also risen, though not
necessarily in response to more exacting job requirements. Rather, education is
often used as a screening device, barring entry to workers with lower levels of
schooling. Increasingly, people with traditionally high levels of education are
drifting into "middle-level" jobs, bumping those with high school or partial college
educations into competitive labor markets further down the occupational scale.
For the new immigrants, then, the job ceiling may have lowered, delaying or alto-
gether preventing the passage from "bad" to "good" jobs and crowding the new-
comers into competitive and unstable labor markets.7
Even if structural changes have not diminished the opportunities for immi-
grant mobility, the emergence of illegal immigration may constitute an even
greater threat to the economic integration of the new immigrants. Certainly the
common perception is that illegality compounds the. economic difficulties arising
from foreign birth, lower levels of education, and insufficient training. Many ana-
lysts argue that "the role of illegal aliens . . . is . . . due to specific differences in
rights, equality under the law, and access to opportunity that aliens have in
America."" Although its conclusions are open to debate, the Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Affairs argued that these disparities have created "an
underclass of workers who fear apprehension and deportation."9
This paper will assay the prospects and actual progress of the new immigrants.
It will survey the empirical evidence to ascertain the factors promoting or
impeding successful occupational integration of the major immigrant groups--
legal immigrants, illegal aliens, and refugees.
II
LEGAL IMMIGRANTS
The shift in immigration policy signalled by the abolition of the national ori-
gins system has produced an immigrant population distinguished by both its num-
bers and its composition. Between 1924 and 1965 only a narrow stream of
newcomers, most of whom were ethnically harmonious with the dominant Anglo-
Saxon core, trickled into the United States. As late as 1965, the traditional
6. Piorej'obs and Tranzhg, in THE STATE AND THE POOR 53 (S. Beer ed. 1970).
7. I. BERG, EDUCATION AND JOBS: THE GREAT TRAINING ROBBERY 14-15 (1971).
8. D. NORTH & A. LEBEL, MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 141
(1978).
9. STAFF OF SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 97TH CONG., IST SESS.,
FINAL REPORT: U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 41-42 (Comm. Print 1981)
[hereinafter cited as SCIRP FINAL REPORT].
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sending countries of Europe and Canada continued to furnish more than half of
the new entrants, with countries such as the United Kingdom or Germany sending
the largest number. The currents of immigration have shifted dramatically since
then. Old World immigrants now absorb a minor share of the quotas allocated to
newcomers and are greatly outnumbered by the new immigrants coming from
Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America. In 1979, the last year for which data are
available, Korea sent almost five times as many immigrants as Germany; Mexico
sent three and a half times the number coming from Britain, and Jamaica sent
three times as many as Italy. Overall, European and Canadian immigrants
accounted for less than one-sixth of the 1979 immigrants, with the remaining
shares split by arrivals from Latin America (39%) and Asia (41%).10
Historically, immigrants were homogeneous populations of persons narrowly
concentrated at the bottom of the occupational scale. Domestic servants and gen-
eral laborers dominated the immigrating population for most of the 19th century
with the upper ranks of industry, commerce, and the professions contributing little
to the flow. I I The recent wave, in contrast, is heterogeneous, resembling the U.S.
population with respect to socioeconomic characteristics. In 1979 white-collar
workers comprised 45% of the immigrants with previous work experience, and it is
likely that the percentage would have been higher still were it not for the large
number of refugees admitted that year. This white-collar group was heavily
weighted toward the more prestigious occupations; almost one-third of the immi-
grants who had worked before moving to the United States had been employed in
either professional, technical, or managerial jobs. Even the blue-collar group con-
tained numerous immigrants with experience in skilled occupations; in 1979, craft
workers made up an additional 11% of the experienced immigrating population.12
The high occupational composition of the immigrant population reveals a
"brain drain" of highly educated and well-trained persons moving from less-devel-
oped countries. In recent years most of these high level immigrants have come
from Asia; indeed, more than half of the 1979 foreign professionals were Asian in
origin. 13 Although four countries alone-the Philippines, India, China, and
Korea-have contributed substantially to this flow, they have produced more
immigrant professionals than either Europe, North America (Canada and Mexico
included), or South America. Overall, Asians are twice as likely to be employed as
professional and technical workers as immigrants from other areas. 14
Despite relatively high occupational levels at home and concomitant levels of
educational achievement, legal immigrants move downwards after entering the
U.S. labor market. Workers from upper tier occupations are apt to be affected
more strongly, especially if they speak English poorly, lack transferable credentials,
10. 1977 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE ANN. REP. 38 [hereinafter cited as INS
REPORT].
11. Easterlin, Immtgraiton. Social and Economic Characterislics, in HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMER-
ICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 480-81 (S. Thernstrom ed. 1980).
12. INS REPORT, supra note 10, at 47.
13. Id.
14. Id.; M. WONG & C. HIRSCHMAN, THE NEW ASIAN IMMIGRANTS 12 (Duke Univ. Center for Int'l
Studies, Occasional Paper Series, 1979).
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face difficult licensing requirements, or need to pass stringent examinations. Many
Koreans, for example, have apparently failed to qualify for upper level jobs,
despite high levels of educational and professional training. A study commissioned
by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare found that nearly 60% of
the Korean residents possess a college degree or better. Only 25% of the profes-
sionals are employed as such, however, while 49% are employed as operatives, craft
workers, or salespeople. 15 Craft workers may not be secure against occupational
sliding, either. In some instances, premigration training may have provided
instruction in techniques that are less sophisticated or outmoded by U.S. stan-
dards; in other cases, union apprenticeship programs may bar entry to a trade. 16
Finally, many immigrants appear to secure employment immediately after
arriving; burdened by debts and unwilling or unable to accept support from rela-
tives, employment at a lower level may seem preferable to an extended search for
the proper job.17 Whatever the cause of downward mobility, most pre-19 7 0 immi-
grants moved along an upwards slope after settlement, gaining increments in pay
as they acquired greater experience, firm-specific training, and greater labor-
market information. Data for immigrants counted by the 1970 census-a popula-
tion largely untouched by the new immigration-indicate that the earning of
immigrants rose with length of residence in the United States. Barry Chiswick has
shown that the earnings of immigrants reached parity with the earnings of compa-
rable natives after ten to fifteen years; thereafter, the former surpassed the latter in
earnings ability.'8
As to the fate of those who have moved to the United States during the past
decade, trends in mobility will only become discernible when data for the 1980
census are made available and analyzed. Yet, Chiswick's own findings portend
slower rates of progress for the newly arrived. Overall, the mobility attained by
the pre-1970 immigrant was buoyed by the record of what was then a predomi-
nately white and European immigrant population. Nonwhite and non-European
immigrants fared notably worse, despite impressively high levels of education.' 9
The disparity suggests that the economic integration of immigrants may encom-
pass more than a simple process of occupational adjustment and that other factors,
in particular discrimination, may influence the eventual outcomes.
A. Asians
The progress of Asian immigrants is a critical case in point. Asian-Americans
have registered notable socioeconomic gains, surmounting formidable barriers of
hostility and discrimination. As a group, Asian-Americans exceed whites in educa-
15. Kim, Ethnic Enterprise Among Korean Immigrants in America, in THE KOREAN DIASPORA 91 (H. Kim
ed. 1977).
16. G. DEFRIETAS, THE RELATIVE EARNINGS OF BLACK IMMIGRANTS: THE AMERICAN CASE 1-14
(Faculty of Economics and Politics, University of Cambridge [England], Research Paper No. 14).
17. G. HENDRICKS, DOMINICAN DIASPORA 75 (1974); R. WALDINGER, NEW IMMIGRANTS IN A
DECLINING INDUSTRY: MIGRATION STRATEGIES AND PATrERNS 30-35 (Joint Center for Urban Studies of
MIT and Harvard Univ., 1981).
18. Chiswick, supra note 2, at 372-76.
19. Id.
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tional attainment, occupational status, and median income. 20 Foreign-born
Asians lag only slightly behind their native counterparts and have outpaced
native-white increases in schooling. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that whites
and Asians are still rewarded disproportionately, with the latter reaping poorer
returns for equal levels of schooling and occupation. Of all Asian groups only the
Japanese have attained parity with whites. 2' Chinese-Americans, by contrast, fail
to match the earnings of their white counterparts when such background variables
as educational level, generational status, and occupation are controlled. Despite
waning prejudice and equal employment codes, discrimination has declined mar-
ginally, if at all, since 1960; one careful estimate has measured the 1976 "cost" of
Chinese ethnicity as $1600 in annual earnings. 22
For immigrants with training and education, economic progress thus follows
settlement in due course, albeit at a pace that may be slower than the immigrants
expect or deserve. A substantial portion of the immigrant population, however,
arrives lacking in schooling and relevant occupational experience. These new-
comers seem to encounter an altogether different experience in the labor market.
Although professionals and managers predominate among Asians, the compo-
sition of this immigrant population diversified significantly during the last half of
the 1970's. Initially, Asian professionals entered the country under quotas reserved
for skilled workers in labor-scarce occupations. Settlement, however, has created a
basis for immigration under familial screening codes, and immigrants with family
ties to permanent residents or citizens need not show evidence of needed occupa-
tional or technical skills. Thus Korean immigration, for example, has come to
draw from a much wider range of backgrounds. Between 1966 and 1968, sixteen
out of every twenty experienced Korean immigrants were professionals, and only
one had been employed in a blue-collar job. 23 By the 1975-1977 period, the pro-
portion of professionals had fallen to ten out of twenty while the blue-collar share
had risen to five out of twenty. 24 Other Asian countries have exhibited a decline in
the proportion of workers with prior occupational experience, a significant devel-
opment, since the latter are often women who take up employment in lower-level
jobs. Consider the Indian case; only 48% of the 1975-1977 immigrants had worked
before moving to the United States in contrast to 59% between 1966 and 1968.25
Upper level Asians thus appear to wend their way through the occupational
hierarchy; their less fortunate counterparts, however, may find themselves trapped
in an ethnic subeconomy. As Wong and Hirschman have pointed out, there is an
"underside" to Asian life that is all too frequently obscured by the image of Asians
20. Jiobu, Earnings Differentials Between Whites and Ethnic Mtortties." The Cases of Astan Americans, Blacks,
and Chicanos, 61 Soc. & SOCIAL RESEARCH 24, 28 (1976).
21. Gwartney & Long, The Relative Earnings of Blacks and Other Mtorities, 31 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
336, 342 (1978).
22. M. Wong, The Cost of Being Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino in the United States: 1960, 1970,
and 1976 at 16-20 (available at Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, Texas); Hirschman & Wong,
Trends in Socioeconomic Achievement Among Immigrant and Native-born Asian-Americans, /960-76, 22 Soc. Q. 495,
507-14 (1981).
23. M. WONG & C. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 14, at 12-13, Table 5.
24. Id
25. Id
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as "model minorities." 26 Notwithstanding the high proportion of Asian profes-
sionals, the overall occupational distribution tends to be bimodal, with a compa-
rable share concentrated in the traditional employments of petty trade and small
industry. Four out of ten Chinese-born men worked in retail trade in 1976, in
sharp contrast to the one-to-ten ratio registered for whites.27 To be sure, small
trade and industry generate their own rewards and may propitiate intergenera-
tional mobility. Yet the returns in such fields are meager given the labor
demanded. The attractions of self-employment can only be understood in light of
the absence of alternative employment opportunities. Small, immigrant-owned
firms, moreover, are viable only because they can draw on a workforce amenable
to low wages and poor working conditions. In 1970, for example, 75% of the res-
taurant workers in New York's Chinatown reported working more than forty
hours a week, and careful but anecdotal evidence suggests that payment of over-
time premiums is regularly waived in Chinese restaurants. 2 8 Similarly, the gar-
ment factories which provide employment to more than 20,000 immigrants in New
York's Chinatown operate under unsafe and substandard conditions and have
recently been cited by the U.S. Department of Labor for violations of wage and
hour codes. 29 Low prevailing wages force Chinese immigrant families to press all
members into the labor force; two-earner families are considerably more common
among the Chinese than among whites. 30 Nonetheless, immigrants frequently find
themselves in straitened circumstances. In 1970, 12.5% of all Chinese families fell
under the poverty line, as compared with 10.8% of all whites. In the Northeast,
where the impact of the new Chinese immigration has been most heavily felt, the
white-Chinese disparity was even greater. 3
B. Latin Americans
Unlike the Asians, among whom the well-educated and socially mobile are a
majority, most Caribbean and Latin American immigrants arrive with back-
grounds unpropitious for economic progress. As a result, they forego many of the
rewards reaped by their more fortunate counterparts. Newcomers with experience
in professional, technical, or managerial jobs-the predominant group among
immigrants as a whole--comprise only a slight share of the Hispanic migration
flow (16% of those who moved in 1979), yielding first place to immigrants who had
previously worked in low-level blue-collar or service occupations (56%).32 Overall,
26. Hirschman & Wong, supra note 22, at 511.
27. Id at 509.
28. Light & Wong, Protest or Work. Dilemmas of the Tourist Industry in American Chinatowns, 80 AM. J.
Soc. 1342, 1352-53 (1975).
29. Richardson, US. Cracks Down on 85 Chinatown Firms, Women's Wear Daily, Oct. 19, 1979, at 1,
col. 1.
30. B. SUNG, A SURVEY OF CHINESE-AMERICAN MANPOWER & EMPLOYMENT 140-43, 151-59
(Praeger Special Studies Program, 1976); M. Wong & C. Hirschman, Asian-American Women: Stratifica-
tion & Sequestration 11-13, 16-17 (paper presented at the Conference in New Directions in Theory &
Methods of Immigration & Ethnicity Research, Duke Univ., May 15-17, 1981).
31: Light & Wong, supra note 28, at 1353.
32. INS REPORT, supra note 10, at 38.
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the percentage of immigrants with experience in low-level jobs is disproportion-
ately of Latin American and Caribbean origin. 33 Mexicans, for example, made up
only one-eleventh of the legal immigrants who moved to the United States in 1979,
but accounted for one-fourth of all those who had previously been employed as
farm laborers. 34
Latin American and Caribbean immigrants are also ill-equipped to attain the
educational and technical thresholds required for entry into many upper-level
jobs. Educational deficiencies among the Mexican immigrant population are par-
ticularly severe; a large scale survey of legal Mexican immigrants found that a
mere 5.5% had received twelve years of schooling or more.3 5 More disturbing still
are the indications that white-immigrant gaps in education have widened rather
than narrowed as the Mexican foreign-born population has grown. One critical
sign is the level of education among different age groups. Among adult men over
fifty-five years of age, secondary education is a rarity among the Mexican-born
(9%), but it is also infrequent among whites (34%). Among the youngest white
male cohort, however, twelve years of schooling is almost universal: 82% of those
aged twenty to twenty-four in 1970 had received twelve years of education or
more. By contrast, only 38% of the Mexican-born men in this group had com-
pleted high school. Central and South Americans exhibit significantly higher rates
of educational attainment; 66% of the foreign-born males aged twenty to twenty-
four had completed high school in 1970 and schooling retention rates through col-
lege were high. Nonetheless, there continues to be a disparity between the educa-
tional levels of whites and Central and South Americans. 36
Like other immigrants, newcomers from the Caribbean and Latin America
earn less than national workers who are equally endowed in such human capital
variables as education or experience. As their length of stay in the United States
increases, their earnings also rise. In his analysis of returns from the 1970 Census
of Population, Chiswick found that the earnings of Mexican immigrants exceeded
the earnings of comparable Mexican-American men after fifteen years. 37 A more
recent study examining the 1976 Survey of Income and Education reports that the
crossover point occurs after twenty years of residence for Mexicans and after seven-
teen years for Central and South Americans. 38
There is, however, a significant difference in the earnings curve of Mexican
immigrants. Unlike other foreign workers, they fail to either equal or surpass the
earnings of comparable native whites, never even approaching that income pla-
teau. 39 The obstacles impeding Mexican immigrants are difficult to specify, but
education and experience do play less important roles in the economic progress of
33. Id
34. Id
35. Portes, Illegal Immigration and the Internainal System: Lessons from Recent Mexican Immigration to the
United States, 26 Soc. PROBS. 425, 429 (1979).
36. A. JAFFE, R. CULLEN & T. BOSWELL, CHANGING DEMOGRAPHY OF SPANISH AMERICANS IN THE
UNITED STATES 31, 135-40 (1981) [hereinafter cited as A. JAFFE].
37. Chiswick, supra note 2, at 379.
38. M. TIENDA & L. NEIDERT, SEGMENTED MARKETS AND EARNINGS INEQUALITY OF NATIVE AND
IMMIGRANT HISPANIC WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (U. Wis. Center for Demography and
Ecology Working Paper 80-13, 1980).
39. Chiswick, supra note 2, at 379.
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Mexican immigrants than in the foreign-born population at large. Chiswick's
analysis, for example, showed that each year of education increased the earnings of
Mexican immigrants by only 3.9% in contrast to 5.7% for all foreign-born whites.4 0
These low returns for education are consistent with the general economic status of
the Mexican-American population and confirm findings that Mexican-Americans
earn less than comparable whites in all occupations. 4 1 Such differences in earnings
comprise the labor market "cost" of Mexican ethnicity; they contribute signifi-
cantly to the low incomes of Mexican-Americans and, despite legal sanctions
against discrimination, appear not to have appreciably declined. 42
These findings suggest that Hispanic immigrants encounter little- trouble in
entering the American economy at its lowest levels. Once inside the economy,
however, they face severe difficulties in "moving up," regardless of whether move-
ment is defined in terms of income or occupational status. This phenomenon
requires a three-part explanation.
First, discrimination bars the route into primary sector firms. Prior occupa-
tional experience and education appear to have little weight in the hiring decisions
of primary sector employers when they are considering Hispanic immigrants. As
one large-scale study of Mexican immigrants showed, premigration occupational
experience barely influenced U.S. occupation; most immigrants were simply com-
pressed into the lowest level positions.43 Foreign birth also compounds the "costs"
of Spanish ethnicity; Mexican and Central and South American-born workers are
even more likely to be consigned to secondary sector employment than their His-
panic-American counterparts. 44
Second, employment in the secondary sector is itself an impediment to upward
mobility. Small, undercapitalized secondary firms frequently rely on antiquated
and backward technology-practices that reduce the chance of learning skills that
could be applied to more remunerative or stable occupations. Nor does secondary
employment foster an ability to venture beyond the confines of the immigrant
community and the immigrant-absorbing industries. Recruitment practices often
create predominantly Hispanic work crews and work tasks rarely require or spur
mastery of English. Moreover, employment relations within the immigrant-
absorbing firm offer little opportunity to learn the functioning of bureaucratic
organizations since secondary employers and employees interact directly and
demands and obligations tend to be interpreted in a highly personal way.45 Thus,
immigrants get "locked into" secondary sector jobs. As evidenced by returns for
the 1976 Survey of Income and Education, a special government study designed to
40. Id. at 375.
41. Jiobu, supra note 20, at 28-30.
42. V. BRIGGS, W. FOGEL & F. SCHMIDT, THE CHICANO WORKER 43-49 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
V. BRIGGS]; Long, productivity, Employment Discriminaton, and the Relative Economic Status of Spanish Oigin
Males, 58 Soc. Sci. Q. 357, 363-71 (1977).
43. Portes, Modes of Strutural Incorporation and Present Theories of Labor Immigration, in GLOBAL TRENDS
IN MIGRATION 279, 284-90 (1981).
44. M. TIENDA & L. NEIDERT, supra note 38, at 17-18.
45. M. PIORE, THE ROLE OF IMMIGRATION IN INDUSTRIAL GROWTH: A CASE STUDY OF THE ORI-
GINS AND CHARACTER OF PUERTO RICAN MIGRATION TO BOSTON 10-14 (MIT Dep't Econ. Working
Paper 112, 1973).
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collect detailed information on low income and minority workers, chances for
mobility from secondary concerns to better paying and more stable primary firms
do not improve with years of residence in the United States. 46
Third, employment conditions in the secondary sector keep wages down. Since
employment levels are unstable and secondary firms lack capital resources, there is
little investment in training. The result, as one recent study of Mexican immi-
grants disclosed, is that experience has almost no positive effect on the earnings of
workers employed in secondary firms. Immobility is yet another depressing factor;
with secondary sector workers having difficulty moving up and out, the very large
number of workers greatly reduces the pressure for wages to rise.4 7
III
ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS
While it is possible to assemble statistics portraying the immigration of illegals
and their participation in the labor market, this is done without the coherence or
certainty that exists in studying the population of legal immigrants. Because the
illegal immigrants comprise a covert population of unknown parameters, surveys
of sample populations are useful for only limited generalization. Moreover,
research efforts have been focused unevenly, with most emphasis going to develop-
ments in the Southwest where illegal immigration is at once most visible and con-
troversial. As a result, the best information concerns the characteristics and
experiences of the primarily Mexican immigrants who congregate in that region.
The most reliable estimates of the illegal population, however, indicate that Mexi-
cans comprise at most 60% of total illegal immigrants; of the remaining 40%, most
of whom reside in the Northeast, only sketchy and often conflicting bits of infor-
mation are available. 48
Nonetheless, a composite portrait of the illegal immigrant population and its
labor market experience can be developed from a variety of sources employing
different methodologies. Information about the characteristics of the illegal popu-
lation can be drawn from studies of illegal immigrants apprehended by the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS),4 9 from surveys of unapprehended illegal
immigrants living and working in the United States,5 0 from interviews conducted
46. M. TIENDA & L. NEIDERT, supra note 38, at 18-20.
47. A. PORTES & R. BACH, DUAL LABOR MARKETS AND IMMIGRATION: A TEST OF COMPETING
THEORIES OF INCOME INEQUALITY 25-28 (Duke Univ. Center for Int'l Studies, Occasional Paper Series,
1979).
48. Siegel, Passel & Robinson, trehtminag Review of Existing Studies of the Number ofllegal Residents in the
United States, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: APPENDIX E TO STAFF
REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY PAPERS ON ILLEGAL MIGRA-
TION TO THE UNITED STATES 13 (1980) (Supplement to SCIRP FINAL REPORT, supra note 9).
49. D. NORTH & M. HOUSTOUN, THE CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE U.S.
LABOR MARKET: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY (1976).
50. S. Maram, Hispanic Workers in the Garment and Restaurant Industries in Los Angeles County:
A Social and Economic Profile (1980) (available from Dep't Industrial Relations, State of California); M.
VAN ARSDOL, J. MOORE, D. HEER & S. HAYNIE, NON APPREHENDED AND APPREHENDED UNDOCU-
MENTED RESIDENTS IN THE LOS ANGELES LABOR MARKET: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY (1979) [herein-
after cited as M. VAN ARSDOL]; G. Cardenas, Manpower Impact and Problems of Mexican Illegal Aliens
in an Urban Labor Market (1977) (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign).
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with return migrants living in their communities of origin,5 1 and from data col-
lected from legal immigrants with previous experience of working illegally in the
United States.52 It is tempting to argue that these various sources, when taken as a
whole, provide a measure of enhanced validity to the data, especially for the Mex-
ican population. Unfortunately, the studies often produce disparate rather than
consistent findings, and it is difficult to determine whether these differences reflect
actual variations within the population or derive from the differing methodologies
employed.
In contrast to legal immigrants, those Mexicans who move to the United States
illegally appear more likely to come from rural backgrounds. Of the 407 Mexicans
surveyed in a national sample of apprehended illegal immigrants (the North-
Houstoun study),5 3 49% had worked as farmers or farm laborers before coming to
work in the United States.5 4 Other studies, however, suggest that urban, blue-
collar workers who closely resemble the legal immigrants may comprise a larger
proportion of the Mexican illegals than commonly has been assumed. Two large-
scale surveys of unapprehended illegal immigrants living in Los Angeles found
that the proportion of illegals with previous experience in blue-collar or service
jobs greatly outweighed the share of former agricultural workers. 55 Sampling dif-
ferences may account for these discrepancies, since the national survey included a
much higher percentage of workers employed as agricultural laborers in the
United States than did either of the two local, urban-based studies.
Other Western Hemisphere illegals compare closely to their legal counterparts
on most socioeconomic indicators. The North-Houstoun study, for example, found
that 40% of the foreign workers in this group had worked in skilled or semiskilled
jobs before moving to the United States, while only 12% had previously been
employed in agriculture. 56 Studies of unapprehended Western Hemisphere ille-
gals and returned migrants who had previously worked in the United States ille-
gally also indicate that occupational and educational attainments tend to exceed
the Mexican norm. 5 7
Illegal immigrants work primarily in the lower tier of the labor market. The
data presented in Table 1 show that the bulk of the illegal Mexican population is
concentrated in low level blue-collar and service occupations, with a heavy repre-
sentation in agriculture. Sampling differences, as explained above, may account
51. W. CORNELIUS, MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
U.S. RESPONSES (1978); Reichert & Massey, Hiltoiy and Trends in U.S Bound Migration From a CentralAmerican
Town, 14 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 475 (1980).
52. Hirschman, Prior US Residence Among Mexican Immigrants, 56 Soc. FORCES 1179 (1978); Portes,
supra note 35; Portes, supra note 43.
53. D. NORTH & M. HouSTOUN, supra note 49.
54. Id at 90.
55. S. Maram, supra note 50, at 10-15; M. VAN ARSDOL, sUpra note 50, at 23-35; C. Keeley, P. Elwell,
A. Fragomen, Jr. & S. Tomasi, Profiles of Undocumented Aliens in New York City: Haitians and Domini-
cans 6-9 (paper presented at the meeting of the Latin Am. Studies Ass'n, Nov. 1977).
56. D. NORTH & M. HOUSTOUN, supra note 49, at 103.
57. Poitras, The U S Experience of Return Mrants from Costa Rica and El Salvador, in U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: APPENDIX E TO STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM'N ON
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, PAPERS ON ILLEGAL MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 109-16
(1980) (supplement to SCIRP FINAL REPORT, supra note 9).
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for the disparate proportions of workers engaged in farm labor. Prior occupational
experience may also exercise an important influence on employment history within
the United States. Studies of rural sending villages in northern Mexico, for
example, report that agriculture is the single largest, if not dominant, occupational
category among out-migrants who work in the United States. While rural out-
migrants may move first to farms, and then in stages toward the cities, migrants of
urban and industrial background may gravitate directly toward the cities. Occu-
pational patterns also appear to be related to variations in migration strategies.
Numerous sources report that temporary, shuttle migration is characteristic of
Mexicans moving to the United States from rural villages. The illegals surveyed in
the Los Angeles studies, however, exhi~ted a greater tendency toward settlement
and it may be that temporary, seasonal patterns can only be maintained when the
demand for labor is regulated by the fluctuations inherent in the harvest labor
market.58
TABLE 1
U.S. OCCUPATIONS OF MEXICAN ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS
North- Los Angeles
Houstoun Community
Occupation Group Studya Studyb
Professional, Technical & Kindred Workers 0.5 3.8
Owners, Managers, Administrators, except Farm - 0.5
Sales Workers 0.7 1.5
Clerical & Kindred Workers - 3.2
Craft & Kindred Workers 14.3 26.7
Operatives, except Transport 21.9 28.8*
Transport Equipment Operatives 0.7 -
Nonfarm Laborers 17.9 11.6
Farmers & Farm Managers - 0.4**
Farm Laborers & Supervisors 27.0 -
Service Workers, except Private Household 13.5 10.9
Private Household Workers 3.4 3.1
Not in Labor Force - 9.5
Number of Respondents 407 2,009
* Includes operatives, transportation.
** Includes farm laborers.
Sources: a. D. North & M. Houstoun, The Characteristics and Role ofIllegal Ahens in the US
Labor Market: An Exploratory Study 104 (1976).
b. M. Van Arsdol, Non-Apprehended and Apprehended Undocumented Residents in the
Los Angeles Labor Market (1979).
The overall occupational trend among Mexican illegals is clearly away from
agriculture. Migration flows have shifted toward urban occupations as mechani-
zation has altered the character of farm work and caused the number of full-time,
58. W. CORNELIUS, supra note 51, at 52-64; Reichert & Massey, supra note 51, at 480-86, 490.
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full-year agricultural jobs to drop severely. 59 A study of migrants from a northern
Mexican agricultural region, for example, found that recent migrants were only
half as likely to work in agriculture as migrants who had worked in the United
States prior to the 1970's.60 Increasingly, the occupational distribution of Mexican
illegal immigrants will resemble the pattern of other Western Hemisphere illegals
who are overwhelmingly concentrated in blue-collar and service occupations, as
illustrated by the data presented in Table 2.
TABLE 2
OCCUPATIONS OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE (MEXICO
ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS
EXCEPTED)
North- Los Angeles Return Migrants
Houstoun Community from Costa Rica
Occupation Group Studya Studyb & El Salvadorc
Professional, Technical &
Kindred Workers 1.7 5.3 10.5
Owners, Managers,
Administrators, except
Farm 1.7 1.8 2.1
Sales Workers 1.2 4.1 5.8
Clerical & Kindred Workers 4.1 3.6 5.6
Craft & Kindred Workers 13.3 18.9 18.8
Operatives, except Transport 36.4 29.0* 11.0
Transport Equipment
Operatives 0.6 - 1.7
Nonfarm Laborers 11.6 5.9 7.0
Farmers & Farm Managers - - 2.6t
Farm Laborers & Supervisors 4.6 - -
Service Workers, except
Private Household 21.4 13.6 30.5*
Private Household Workers 3.5 7.7 -
Not in Labor Force - 10.1 4.4
No. of Respondents 173 169 575
* Includes operatives, transportation.
t Presumably includes farm laborers. More precise occupational categories not specified.
Presumably includes private household workers. More precise occupational categories
not reported.
Sources: a. D. North & M. Houstoun, The Characteristics and Role of lllegalAhins in the U.S
Labor Market. An Exploratoly Study 104 (1976).
b. M. Van Arsdol, Non-Apprehended and Apprehended Undocumented Residents in the
Los Angeles Labor Market (1979).
c. G. Poitras, The US Experence of Return Migrants from Costa Rica and El Salvador,
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: APPENDIX E TO
STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
POLICY, PAPERS ON ILLEGAL MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 112 (1980)
(SUPPLEMENT TO SCIRP FINAL REPORT).
59. W. FOGEL, MEXICAN ILLEGAL ALIEN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 82-86 (1968); Reichert &
Massey, supra note 51, at 489-90.
60. W. CORNELIUS, supra note 51, at 54-55.
NEW IMMIGRANTS
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
Illegal immigrants occupy the lowest paying jobs in the occupational categories
in which they are concentrated. The North-Houstoun study, for example, found
that both the hourly and weekly earnings of illegals were lower than the earnings
of native workers employed in the same occupational categories. 6 1 Despite their
low wages, most illegal immigrants appear to be paid at or slightly above the min-
imum wage. Only 16% in the North-Houstoun study had been paid below the
minimum wage, with most wage violations occurring among agricultural
employers whose farms were located near the U.S.-Mexican border.62 In addition,
respondents who reported wage violations were apt to be more recent immigrants
whose stay in the United States was lower than the sample average. 6 3 This finding
is corroborated by Cornelius' survey of sending villages in northern Mexico where
reports from recent and older migrants indicate that the level of exploitation has
decreased as the migrant stream has shifted away from agricultural workers. 64
The newest evidence, however, suggests that a substantial minority of the
illegal population may be engaged in "black work." Infractions of the labor codes
now appear to occur on a fairly wide scale among light manufacturing, service,
and construction firms employing undocumented immigrants. A survey of 826
illegal restaurant and garment workers in Los Angeles found that wage underpay-
ments affect 30% to 40% of the workforce; studies of illegal foreign workers
employed in two different areas in Texas found that average hourly earnings fell
below the minimum wage. 65 Other data derived from the investigations of federal
and state labor standards agencies also point to extensive minimum wage, over-
time, and child labor violations in industries employing large numbers of undocu-
mented workers.66 Patterns of exploitation are thought to be considerably more
severe in the Southwest than in the Northeast. Many undocumented workers
employed in the latter region have entered industries that are heavily unionized.
Even those that are employed in nonunion enterprises may benefit from the firms'
need to maintain competitive wage scales. The importance of unions in the North-
east, however, seems primarily to mitigate the severity of exploitation, not eradi-
cate it completely. Infractions of overtime provisions appear to be particularly
common, 6 7 and many illegal immigrants work in aging industrial structures which
do not conform to legal health and safety standards.68
Evidence on the mobility of illegal immigrants is extremely fragmentary.
Reanalyzing the data from the national survey of apprehended illegals, Chiswick
61. D. NORTH & M. HoUSTOUN, supra note 49, at 124-27.
62. Id
63. Id
64. W. CORNELIUS, Supra note 51, at 60-61.
65. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SIN PAPELES: THE UNDOCUMENTED IN MEXICO 40-45 (1980).
66. Stetson, Sweatshops Thrive Despite Union and Federal Efobrts, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1979, at Ai;
Crewdson, Inquig in Texas Finds Employers Cheating Aliens, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1979, at A 16, Col. 1.
67. T. BAILEY & M. FREEDMAN, IMMIGRANT & NATIVE-BORN WORKERS IN THE RESTAURANT
INDUSTRY 73-75, 123-26 (1981).
68. R. Waldinger, Immigrant Enterprise & Labor Market Structure 1I, 20-22 (Paper presented to the
meeting of the American Sociological Association, Sept. 1982).
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found that illegal immigrants came within 2% of the hourly earnings of Mexican-
born U.S. residents or citizens if human capital variables for schooling, total labor
market experience, years in the United States, and marital status were held con-
stant. 69 Like the legal immigrants, the earnings of illegal workers increased with
residence in the United States. Chiswick estimated that about two-thirds of the
difference in hourly earnings was due to the shorter period of time that the illegals
had spent in the United States.70 Similarly, Cornelius found that age, education,
and especially length of time in the United States explained most of the earnings
differences between legal and illegal migrants as well as legal and illegal immi-
grant settlers. 7 1 Other studies, however, suggest that illegal immigrants may
encounter severe impediments in their quest for upward mobility. The survey of
undocumented workers in Los Angeles conducted by Maurice Van Arsdol and his
associates found no significant relationship between earnings and any human cap-
ital variables, despite the fact that Los Angeles workers were better endowed in
prior education and work experience and reported larger average periods of U.S.
residence than their counterparts -in the two studies mentioned above. 72 A survey
of a large sample of legal Mexican immigrants found that when controlled for
relevant social and economic variables, occupational levels of immigrants who had
previously migrated illegally remained lower than the levels reported by persons
migrating to the United States for the first time.73 Although it is difficult to
explain these contradictions, there is reason to think that sampling differences do
not lie at the heart of the disparity. First, the samples are sufficiently similar,
particularly with respect to duration of stay, the variable that appears to exert the
greatest explanatory power. Second, it is unlikely that relatively slight differences
in occupational mix could account for the marked discrepancy in the effect of
human capital variables (57% in the Chiswick study and 17% in the Van Arsdol
report). One hypothesis, consistent with the findings on the lack of mobility of
Mexican legal immigrants, is that mobility patterns for rural and urban immi-
grants diverge. While rural migrants who initially enter agricultural jobs and
gradually infiltrate urban employments thereby attain incremental improvements
in earning power, urban-industrial migrants who are directly recruited into low
wage jobs in the secondary sector never move into primary sector jobs and conse-
quently fail to gain rewards for experience or training.
Although these studies do not allow for a definitive assessment of the impact of
illegal status on the integration of undocumented immigrants, there is little likeli-
hood that the "underclass" thesis can be sustained in its stronger versions. That
thesis assumes that the firm legal distinction between undocumented and legal
immigrants is somehow mirrored in the migration process itself and that for each
legal category there is a corresponding separate group of persons with its own par-
ticular characteristics. The evidence, however, suggests that legal and illegal flows
69. Chiswick, supra note 2, at 379-80.
70. Id
71. W. CORNELIUS, supra note 51, at 90-93.
72. M. VAN ARSDOL, supra note 50, at 72-98.
73. Hirschman, supra note 52, at 1189, 1192-94.
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are not dichotomous movements. Rather, the immigration system seems to con-
tain channels for passage from one status to another, thereby facilitating a process
by which illegal immigrants "drop out" of the migrant stream to settle as perma-
nent, legal residents. One large-scale study of Mexican legal immigrants, for
example, found that at least seven out of ten immigrants were former illegals.7 4
The reasons for this flexibility further undermine the viability of the "under-
class" thesis. The thesis, it should be noted, also accepts the basic postulates of
conventional migration theory, supposing that migration is an individualistic phe-
nomenon in which economic "pushes" and "pulls" propel isolated individuals into
new, unknown environments. The studies of the new immigration, however, show
that migration does not uproot random individuals into totally unfamiliar con-
texts. Rather, migration is a social process that is mediated by longstanding
family, friendship, and community ties that facilitate moving and ease the
migrant's integration into his new environment. 75 The best illustration of this pro-
cess is the long history of Mexican immigration, which has reproduced in the
United States extensive kinship and friendship networks into which new arrivals,
whether legal or illegal, can be immediately integrated. These networks often con-
sist of emigrants from the same community in Mexico. Legal Mexican immi-
grants, for example, who were interviewed as they entered the United States
reported with virtual unanimity that they expected to be met by one or more
friends or relatives. When the same migrants were reinterviewed three years later,
most were living in close proximity to one or more relatives. 76
The importance of such informal ties is enhanced because the de jure system
institutionalizes chain migration, privileging family relationships between foreign
nationals and U.S. citizens and permanent residents. Thus immigrant visas are
rationed on the basis of family ties, with connections of parentage and marriage
given highest preference. The operation of this system further tends to obliterate
the distinction between legals and illegals. Family relationships must technically
be established prior to entry as a legal immigrant. Yet the sequence is often
reversed for undocumented settlers who establish family relationships with perma-
nent residents or settlers while living illegally in the United States. Moreover, the
status of such illegal settlers is often stabilized by the way in which the immigra-
tion codes are enforced. In these cases the INS usually waives the grounds of
expulsion, conceding the illegal settler's right to permanent residency in the near
future.
Finally, there is the issue of the relationship of illegal and legal immigrants in
the labor market. The argument of the "underclass" thesis is that the two play
utterly distinct labor market roles; central to this hypothesis is the assertion that
undocumented workers are attractive because their illegality makes them docile
and potentially vulnerable to exploitation. The ubiquity of family ties, however,
74. Portes, supra note 35, at 427.
75. Tilly & Brown, On Uprooting, Kinship, and the Auspices ofMigration, 8 INT'L J. COMP. SOC. 139, 139-
45 (1967).
76. Tienda, Famiisrm and Structural Assimnilation of Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 14 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. 383, 393-96 (1980).
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also influences the participation of illegals in the labor market. Several studies of
Mexican and Latin American immigrants have found that illegal immigrants rely
almost exclusively on their kinship or friendship connections to obtain employ-
ment. This process operates swiftly and efficiently, often netting the migrant a job
shortly after arrival. 77 Evidence recently brought to light indicates that such
informal ties are useful to the immigrant because immigrant-absorbing firms pri-
marily recruit labor through the immigrant kinship and friendship network.7 In
contrast to the patterns predicted by the "underclass" thesis, several industry case
studies have also shown that the principal function of network recruiting does not
lie in the acquisition of a more docile workforce. Rather, immigrant-absorbing
firms use network recruiting as a predictive and stabilizing strategy. On the one
hand, it enables them to predict the characteristics of new workers from the atti-
tudes and behavioral traits of the old employees who recruit newly arrived friends
and relatives. On the other hand, it helps stabilize the workforce by promoting a
relationship among all the parties to the recruitment process and forging bonds of
mutual obligation and reciprocity. Thus, newcomers who gain employment in
immigrant-absorbing industries are employed in a structured context where social
ties to settlers double as work relationships. These factors mitigate any putative
tendencies towards exploitation and further diminish the labor market distinction
between illegals and their legal counterparts. 79
IV
REFUGEES
Though America has been a haven from persecution since its inception, most of
the newcomers drawn to the New World have been immigrants seeking economic
opportunity. Since World War II, however, victims of the economic and political
disasters of our century have converged on the United States in growing number.
The survivors of Hitler's concentration camps and persons swept up by the
upheaval of World War II were the first major group of refugees admitted in the
postwar era. They were followed less than a decade later by the 35,000 refugees
who fled Hungary in the aftermath of the 1956 uprising and subsequent Soviet
reprisals. The harbingers of the current refugee tide from the Third World began
to arrive from Cuba in 1958, just as Batista's regime tottered on the brink of
extinction, and with the Cuban revolution, what had been a trickle swelled quick-
ly to a torrent. Through three successive waves, 1959-1962, 1965-1974, and 1980,
almost 1,000,000 Cuban refugees fled to the United States. Finally, the collapse of
the South Vienamese regime in 1975, the fall of the coalition government in Laos,
and the subsequent Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia generated the newest mas-
sive source of refugees. As of this writing, almost 400,000 Indochinese have entered
the United States in the mere span of five years. Smaller groups of refugees from
77. W. CORNELIUS, THE FUTURE OF MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN CALIFORNIA 24-25 (1980); R. WALD-
INGER, supra note 17, at 30-35.
78. R. WALDINGER, supra note 17, at 30-35; R. WALDINGER, IMMIGRATION & INDUSTRIAL CHANGE:
A CASE STUDY OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE NEW YORK CITY GARMENT INDUSTRY 89-91 (1982).
79. T. BAILEY & M. FREEDMAN, supra note 67, at 50-52, 71-73; R. Waldinger, supra note 68, at 15-17.
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the Soviet Union, the Mid East, Chile, and Ethiopia-whose experience we shall
not examine here-have also arrived in recent years.8 0
The crises that propelled these refugee movements have left their imprint on
subsequent patterns of occupational and economic integration. Unlike such his-
toric and longstanding movements as the migration of workers from Mexico to the
southwestern United States, these refugee flows have arisen episodically and spon-
taneously, carrying in their wake persons well-established in a socially specific field
and ill-prepared for a lengthy process of occupational adjustment. The refugees,
then, tend to differ from "economic" immigrants. The former are apt to be older;
often they have already acquired a skill which they have successfully exercised for
a significant period of time. Frequently their proficiency is specific to their home
society and has little or different application in the society to which they flee.
Conventional economic theory suggests that the economic integration of refu-
gees will proceed along a different and more difficult path than the one generally
followed by "economic" immigrants. Possessing skills that are specific to the firm,
industry, or social context in which they were acquired, the margin for transfera-
bility to the new society will be narrow for many refugees. Doctors, to be sure, will
fare better than lawyers; assuming comparable levels of technology, mechanics
may do better than teachers. Nonetheless, downward mobility and little or no
payoff for previous education and work experience are likely to be the common
fare of the refugee. Age, moreover, is another hindrance.' Being older, refugees
have already made a substantial investment in specific skills, yet face a shortened
working life in the country of asylum. Employers in core firms, who seek a sub-
stantial payback for any investment in retraining, may be reluctant to hire refu-
gees for these reasons."'
A. Cuban Refugees
The experience of Cuban refugees partially validates these predictions. The
refugees who came with the earliest waves stemmed largely from the elite of
Cuban society. To be sure, this was not a simple "departure of the privileged," as
Fagen, Brody, and O'Leary noted in Cubans in Exile. 82 Though bus drivers,
mechanics, and shoe salesmen were also present in the exile, the first wave was
marked by the overrepresentation of the better educated and white-collar segment
of Cuban society. Although just 9% of the Cuban population were lawyers, judges,
professionals, and managers, this group made up 37% of the exiles.8 3 Though
every four out of ten exiles had received twelve or more years of schooling, only
four out of one hundred Cubans had been equally fortunate.8 4
Subsequent waves have come from lower layers of Cuban society. Yet they do
not present a cross section of Cuban society at large; nor, despite the unfavorable
80. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REVIEW OF U.S. REFUGEE PROGRAMS AND POLICIES, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 24-42 (1979).
81. Chiswick, supra note 2, at 363-70.
82. R. FAGEN, R. BRODY & T. O'LEARY, CUBANS IN EXILE 24 (1968).
83. Id at 19.
84. Id
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publicity given the exiles who fled from the port of Mariel in 1980, do they stem
from Cuba's underclass. Rather, the "new wave" of refugees seems representative
of the urban lower-middle and lower classes. Educational levels, accordingly, are
lower than in the earlier exile cohorts, averaging close to nine years for both the
most recent refugees and those who came during the late 1960's and early 1970's. 85
Similarly, there are fewer professionals than before, with workers from lower
white-collar occupations, skilled crafts, and service trades predominating. 86
Though the economic achievements of Cuban refugees have been widely cele-
brated, the exiles' encounter with American society gives ground for a more
sobering picture. As theory would predict, most Cubans have slid a considerable
distance from the positions they occupied before migration. Eleanor Rogg, who
studied the heavily Cuban community of West New York, New Jersey, during the
late 1960's, found that most Cubans had experienced substantial downward
mobility.8 7 The refugees had been compressed into an occupationally homoge-
neous group of semiskilled workers; of the former professionals and former white-
collar workers, 70% of each group was then employed in just such jobs.38 A follow-
up study conducted almost a decade later found evidence of subsequent upward
mobility.8 9 Yet the great majority of refugees were employed in blue-collar occu-
pations and only 30% had succeeded in moving into positions that were higher
than the jobs occupied before leaving Cuba.90
The general pattern, then, is one of great downward mobility followed by
upward movement that nonetheless leaves the refugee short of the position
attained before fleeing to the United States. At the time of arrival, unfamiliarity
with the English language and lack of specific skills erase the labor market impor-
tance of prior education and experience and it is this factor that accounts for the
initial occupational compression of the refugee community. Over time, education
comes more heavily into play, spurring some movement back up the occupational
scale. The constraints to mobility, however, remain severe. The monetary returns
on education never attain the rates achieved by native white workers, thereby
depressing earnings, and American employers appear to accord little if any value
to work experience obtained before migration. 9' As an ironic byproduct, this pro-
cess levels the differences within the Cuban community: downward mobility is
greatest among high status refugees, while those who had occupied lower level
positions are most successful in moving up in America. 92
The emergence of a burgeoning Cuban subeconomy within the confines of
Dade County, Florida, and some of the other important Cuban communities in
85. Bach, The New Cuban Immigrants.- Their Background and Prospects, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 1980,
at 40; Portes, Clark & Bach, The New Wave. A Statistical Profile of Recent Cuban Exiles to the United States, 7
CUBAN STUDIES 1, 9-18 (1977).
86. Portes, Clark & Bach, supra note 85.
87. E. ROGG, THE AssIMILATION OF CUBAN EXILES 105-07 (1974).
88. Id
89. E. RoGG & R. COONEY, ADAPTATION AND ACCULTURATION OF CUBAN MIGRANTS: WEST NEW
YORK, NEW JERSEY 38-39 (1980).
90. Id
91. Chiswick, supra note 2, at 376-79.
92. Long, supra note 42, at 363-7 1.
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New Jersey has created an alternative mode of economic integration. While immi-
grant communities often provide a limited niche for specialized immigrant-owned
concerns, the size and diversity of the Cuban entrepreneurial enclave suggests that
this is a phenomenon of much greater import. In Dade County alone, almost one-
third of the businesses are presently immigrant-owned. The Cuban immigrant
enclave includes more than 150 manufacturing firms, 230 Latino restaurants, 30
furniture factories, a shoe factory employing 3,000 people, and 30 transplanted
cigar factories. Nor is Cuban enterprise confined to the lower segments of the
economy. Sixteen out of 62 bank presidents in Dade County are Cuban and they
work alongside 250 Cuban vice presidents and an additional 500 Cuban bank
officers. 93
Although knowledge about the characteristics of the Cuban subeconomy and
its functioning is still limited, that economy appears large enough to absorb a sig-
nificant share of incoming refugees. One study that has been following the pro-
gress of 590 Cuban refugees who arrived in 1973-1974 found that four out of ten
initially obtained employment in an immigrant-owned or managed firm.94 Six
years later the same proportion existed in an enclave enterprise, indicating that the
immigrant enclave is a source of stable employment. 95 More importantly, those
refugees working in immigrant-owned firms after three years of residence were
earning significantly more money than their counterparts employed in secondary
sector firms that were not part of the immigrant enclave. 9 6 Enclave firms also
provided more substantial rewards for education and experience than secondary
sector concerns.
97
Why and how enclave firms facilitate the process of economic integration is as
yet unclear. Several preliminary studies suggest that immigrant enterprises use
ethnic affinities to widen their access to labor markets. 98 By hiring through the
immigrant network, enclave firms induce privileged work arrangements that com-
pensate for the managerial, technological, and capital deficiencies of the immi-
grant-owned concern. By the same token, employment in an enclave firm brings
advantages foregone by workers hired by secondary sector firms. Reciprocal obli-
gations between owner and worker promote training and facilitate job mobility.
Common ethnic ties minimize the likelihood that job advancement may be
impeded by discrimination, and the expansion of the immigrant enclave creates
new opportunities for immigrants in which they can exploit past investments in
specific skills. 99
The optimism suggested by this picture of the ethnic enclave, however, must be
tempered by the continued disparity in native white-Cuban economic status.
93. Hi:panicAmrnian Immgrants, Soon.- The B gestMAtor'o, TIME, Oct. 16, 1978, at 48, 51; BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1977 SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESSES: SPANISH
ORIGIN 130.
94. Wilson & Portes, Immigrant Enclaves: An Analysis of the Labor Market Experience of Cubans in Miami, 86
AM. J. Soc. 295, 308-14 (1980).
95. Id
96. Id
97. Id. ; see also Bach, supra note 85, at 45.
98. T. BAILEY & M. FREEDMAN, supra note 67, at 73-78.
99. Id; R. Waldinger, supra note 68; Wilson & Portes, supra note 94, at 314-16.
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Cubans still have lower incomes than whites; they are more heavily concentrated
in lower level occupations, and they suffer from higher than average rates of unem-
ployment. 0 0 In the past, Cubans benefited from a favorable public image that
may have weakened discrimination.' 0 ' Public perception seems to have been
damaged, however, by the refugee wave of 1980, as reflected in the successful refer-
endum repealing Dade County's 1973 bilingual ordinance. 0 2 Thus, the prospects
for successful economic integration, while more favorable than for other Hispanic
groups, remain uncertain. 0 3
B. Indochinese Refugees
The influx of Indochinese refugees bears a certain resemblance to the migra-
tion of Cuban exiles. Like the Cuban refugee flow, this has been a migration of
relatively skilled and well-educated people. Yet the tide that has carried almost
400,000 refugees from Indochina has been a distinct phenomenon.
Though refugee movements are by nature uncertain and difficult, to predict,
none has arisen as suddenly or spontaneously as the outpouring from Vietnam in
1975. Moreover, historically most refugees have been able to draw on already
settled members of their own ethnic community who can aid in the resettlement
process and help diminish the sense of loss and discontinuity. Some refugees, to be
sure, have been luckier in this respect than others. For every one Hungarian ref-
ugee arriving in 1957, for example, there were eighteen Americans of Hungarian
descent; there were five settled Cuban-Americans for each refugee arriving in the
wake of the Cuban revolution. In the case of the Vietnamese, however, the settled
community was of such miniscule proportions that it was greatly overshadowed by
the very first wave of refugees arriving in 1975. Finally, the Indochinese are in the
first non-European, nonwestern movement of refugees to America, and the racial
and cultural differences have important implications for the process of
integration. 104
The impact of these factors has been mitigated by the characteristics of the
refugees themselves. As in the Cuban case, the composition of the refugee popula-
tion has changed with successive waves. The earliest refugees were highly edu-
cated; only one out of five adult refugees had received less than eight years of
schooling and many had attended elite, private French schools in Vietnam. 10 5
Occupationally, the refugees stemmed from the upper tiers: professional, tech-
nical, and managerial workers comprised the single largest group while the earliest
waves were notable for the virtual absence of refugees with agrarian backgrounds.
A substantial minority of the refugees, moreover, had gained some benefit from
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their long wartime contact with the American army and seven out of twenty
households already knew enough English to function on a job at the time of arrival
in the United States. 10 6 More recent evidence suggests that the most privileged
Vietnamese were the first to escape and that the more recent inflows are more
representative of the population. A review conducted by the General Accounting
Office concluded that the newest refugees are generally "poorer, less able to speak
English, [and] less exposed to urban environments" than those that preceded
them. 10 7
The level of employment is the best current indicator of the economic integra-
tion of the Indochinese refugees. It is relevant for several reasons. Unlike immi-
grants who pass immediately into civilian life and whose absorption into American
society is greatly aided by the presence and contacts of friends and relatives, the
Indochinese were initially interned in resettlement centers and then moved to loca-
tions where sponsors could be found. Moreover, both the officials administering
the resettlement programs and the populace at large plainly feared that the refu-
gees would become a dependent population absorbing large sums of money
through public assistance while never fully entering the labor force.
Recent data indicate that labor force participation rates among the refugees
are indeed lower than average. 10 8 Yet the disparity obscures basic differences
among the various refugee waves themselves and, more importantly, hides an
encouraging trend. Not surprisingly, labor force participation rates rise with years
of residence and the oldest wave of refugees has already attained near-average
rates. The newest refugees, however, do not yet participate to the same extent and
it is this factor that holds down the overall rate. 10 9
While the fact of economic activity can be considered a positive sign, it is clear
that many Vietnamese have entered the labor force by moving into the lower
classes. Refugees with experience in upper-level jobs are still predominantly
employed in blue-collar positions and those who have been fortunate enough to
secure work in white-collar positions are generally engaged in fairly routinized low
status jobs. Moreover, the anecdotal evidence provided by some of the other spon-
soring agencies suggests that many of the blue-collar jobs are of the most unskilled
kind. Notwithstanding this low occupational position, many refugees appear to
have experienced some economic mobility. Income levels have gradually
increased, although some of the improvement is due to the simple fact that a much
larger than average percentage of refugees works more than forty hours a week.
Welfare dependency is still appreciable, yet it has declined significantly and tends
to account for a very small percentage of family income among those still receiving
assistance. 1 10
Overall, however, the rates of progress are not impressive in comparison to the
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experience of other refugee or immigrant groups. Although the reasons for slower
progress are still difficult to ascertain, one likely factor is the role of government
policy. Heavy pressure from both the government and the private sponsoring
agencies has been exerted upon the refugees to accept any available job and not
hold out for a position more compatible with previous skills and experience. This
insistence reflected a perspective on the resettlement process that was common to
both parties, namely, that the most critical element in resettlement is attaining
self-sufficiency.III A related factor may be the lack of government involvement in
retraining. In contrast to other countries that have accepted large numbers of
refugees-for example, Canada or Australia-the United States invested only
small sums in preparing the refugees to resume their pre-migration occupations.
In fact, the government has sponsored only two retraining programs. The two
assisted groups---doctors and dentists-actually represent a tremendous savings to
American society with respect to total training costs. 112 Even instruction in Eng-
lish as a second language has not received significant funding. Moreover, the
resettlement process has been run in a highly decentralized fashion. Most of the
sponsors have been private organizations, and the placement effort has been splin-
tered among numerous agencies with inadequate coordination and supervision.
While some agencies have undoubtedly performed at extremely high levels, others
have done considerably less well.1 13
V
CONCLUSION
"Immigration fear" has been a chronic American affliction. Though Ameri-
cans usually subscribe to the notion that theirs is a "country of immigrants," they
do so ambivalently and often with the tacit assumption that the present mix of
immigrants and ethnics needs no further tampering. Immigration anxiety has
taken a number of different forms. At an earlier point in American culture, Anglo-
conformists feared immigrants for the biological threat that they posed to the
"pure" American stock. Today, in a period when crude nativist sentiment has
sharply declined, the apprehension that immigrants arouse is linked to protec-
tionist feelings about the ability of our economy to absorb newcomers and the
perception that immigrants may comprise a permanent "underclass."
The historical experience of immigrants strongly contravenes this argument.
Moreover, there is ample ground to think that the generation of "new immigrants"
that has been moving to the United States since the late 1960's will forge ahead
successfully in the race for economic success. Numerous factors shape the pros-
pects facing new immigrants. Immigration is a process of self-selection that gener-
ates a group of people more determined and less vulnerable to setback than the
average individual. Undoubtedly, these qualities count heavily in the success of
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the "new immigrants," but they are also qualities that all immigrants have histori-
cally shared. What distinguishes this generation of newcomers and critically
favors their mobility is their high level of education and skill. Moreover, the
decline of discrimination and increasing acceptance of ethnic diversity ease the
path of economic integration.
Of the major "new" immigrant groups, Asians and Cubans have attained the
greatest success so far. As noted, Asian-Americans have surmounted great obsta-
cles to climb to near economic parity with native whites. Though the tide of anti-
Oriental prejudice has not totally receded, the newest immigrants do not confront
the barriers of discrimination that faced their predecessors. They begin, moreover,
from more advantaged circumstances: the "new" Asian immigrants are far better
educated than the "old," enjoying levels of schooling that also exceed the average
for native whites. These factors generally bode well for the new Asian immigrants,
but there is a more somber side to the picture as well. A substantial minority of
the new immigrant population remains trapped in an ethnic subeconomy where
low incomes, long hours, and poor working conditions are the norm. The history
of Asian-Americans suggests that the children of the immigrants will escape to
better jobs and more prosperous lives; that undoubtedly is the hope of the immi-
grants themselves.
Problematic as the "underside" of Asian immigrant life may be, far more
serious is the fact that Mexican, Latin American, and Caribbean immigrants have
yet to progress at rates that compare with the white-immigrant or Asian-immi-
grant norm. To a large extent the new Hispanic immigrants are emmeshed in a
vicious circle where mutually reinforcing factors impede mobility. On the one
hand; levels of education are significantly lower than average--especially among
Mexicans. The effects of little schooling are compounded by the ever-increasing
"credentialization" of American society, a trend that raises the threshold for job
mobility among the undereducated. On the other hand, advancement is impeded
by the very structure of the American economy: the fact that so many Hispanics
gain employment in the secondary sector depresses income and leaves them
searching vainly for a gateway to more remunerative and stable jobs.
To be sure, the portrait of the socioeconomic status of these immigrants should
not be painted in black. Latin American and Caribbean immigrants are generally
better educated and enjoy higher levels of income than their Mexican counter-
parts.1 14 Moreover, there are signs that intergenerational mobility is proceeding
more smoothly than the integration of the first generation of immigrants. Amer-
ican-born Mexicans, in particular, have made notable gains in schooling. 15 Yet
the prospects of the latter must be judged lacking. The overall income of Mex-
ican-Americans is still substantially lower than average. While the incomes of
second and third generation Mexican-Americans generally exceed immigrant
levels, the margin is slight and the payoff for the greater education possessed by the
native-born counterparts extremely disappointing."16
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Assessing the status of illegal immigrants is more difficult. While it is probably
too early to pass a definitive judgment on the claim that illegal immigrants com-
prise a new "underclass," the extreme versions of this thesis are certainly not borne
out. As we have shown, the illegals migrate and work in a social context that is
structured by an extensive web of kinship, friendship, and hometown connections.
Moreover, the fact that many illegal immigrants subsequently attain legal status-
a phenomenon that Alejandro Portes has labelled the "return of the 'wet-
back' "" '-suggests that undocumented workers are not so severely confined to
the underreaches of American society. The empirical evidence on the mobility
and earnings of illegal immigrants, however, cuts both ways, barring any clear-cut
verdict on the impact of "illegality" per se on the process of economic integration.
In addition, the indications that a substantial, though undetermined, number of
illegals participate in an "underground economy" of firms that violate wage codes
and minimum working standards are quite disturbing. Ultimately, the critical
variable may be the fact that the illegals have gained access to the labor market at
the very lowest levels and that, in the late 20th century, upward movement from
these levels can be most difficult.
Fortunately, one can be somewhat more sanguine about the prospects of the
major refugee groups. As the popular press has ofttimes discovered, there is much
to celebrate in the economic progress achieved by the Cuban refugees. Moreover,
the Cuban business enclave-a somewhat exotic phenomenon that journalists
enjoy spotlighting-in fact turns out to have important and positive implications
for the income and mobility of the exiles from Cuba. The educational and occu-
pational levels of second generation Cubans have also risen impressively, and there
is ground to suggest that they might recoup the occupational losses that their par-
ents sustained in fleeing to the United States. For the moment, however, the path
towards economic integration is not all smooth. The indicators of employment
and income reveal a continued disparity in the socioeconomic condition of the
Cuban population. 1 8 It should also be remembered that the Cuban community
has just received a large complement of refugees in a very short time and that
while these refugees resemble their "second wave" predecessors, their encounter
with American society has just begun. One question mark regarding their progress
is whether enclave enterprises can absorb a large enough portion of these new-
comers to prevent the pattern of downward mobility noted earlier. Another uncer-
tainty is whether the difference in the economic conditions that have greeted the
successive waves of refugees-notably the disparity between the prosperous 1960's
and the sluggish 1980's-will adversely affect the opportunities of the newest
refugees. 119
As for the Indochinese, no clear judgment can be reached yet. There are signs
of significant economic progress, but these are balanced by less favorable trends in
the rate of occupational mobility. There are also indications that the Indochinese
have already attempted to pursue the strategy of ethnic enterprise. Unfortunately,
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this has created conflict with national competitors, and it is unclear how well
immigrant enterprises can endure amidst such hostility. Finally, one must
acknowledge the fact that history provides no guide for a group that has migrated
in such numbers and in such a short time. Other immigrants have benefited
greatly from the sheltering functions that previously settled members of the group
could provide. Moreover, where large numbers of newcomers have migrated
within a short period of time and have overwhelmed the size and resources of
settled communities-as in the case of blacks migrating to the northern United
States-the results have often been unfortunate. Whether and to what extent the
Indochinese will overcome the disadvantages of "newness" is a critical question
that only future inquiry can answer. 20
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